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Dehumanizing attitudes and behaviors frequently occur in organizational settings and
are often viewed as an acceptable, and even necessary, strategy for pursuing personal
and organizational goals. Here I examine a number of commonly held beliefs about
dehumanization and argue that there is relatively little support for them in light of the
evidence emerging from social psychological and neuroscientific research. Contrary to
the commonly held belief that everyday forms of dehumanization are innocent and
inconsequential, the evidence shows profoundly negative consequences for both victims
and perpetrators. As well, the belief that suppressing empathy automatically leads to
improved problem solving is not supported by the evidence. The more general belief that
empathy interferes with problem solving receives partial support, but only in the case
of mechanistic problem solving. Overall, I question the usefulness of dehumanization in
organizational settings and argue that it can be replaced by superior strategies that are
ethically more acceptable and do not entail the severely negative consequences associated
with dehumanization.
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INTRODUCTION
Dehumanizing attitudes and behaviors frequently occur in orga-
nizational settings and are often viewed as an acceptable, and even
necessary, strategy for pursuing personal and organizational goals.
Behind this view, there lie a number of commonly held beliefs
about dehumanization. These beliefs are culturally determined,
rather than based on scientific observation. One such belief is
that subtle forms of dehumanization, such as disrespect, conde-
scension, and neglect, are innocent and inconsequential. It is also
commonly believed that empathy interferes with problem solving
and that therefore, suppressing our naturally occurring empathy,
and the dehumanization this suppression entails, are necessary to
help us make better decisions and improve our problem solving
capacity.
Are those beliefs supported by the scientific evidence? Here
I review social psychological and neuroscientific advances on
dehumanization and show that a number of our beliefs about
dehumanization are not supported by the evidence. Although the
belief that empathy interferes with problem solving is partially
supported, the scientific evidence on this is very new and still
contentious. Overall, I question the usefulness of dehumanization
in organizational settings and argue that it can be replaced by
superior strategies that are ethically more acceptable and do not
entail the severely negative consequences that are often associated
with dehumanization.
DEHUMANIZATION AS AN EVERYDAY PHENOMENON
Early psychological theories viewed dehumanization as an
extreme phenomenon, occurring primarily in the context of
ethnic or racial intergroup conflict (Kelman, 1976; Staub,
1989; Opotow, 1990). More recently, however, an expanded
view of dehumanization has emerged. This expanded view
recognizes that dehumanization can occur in interpersonal
as well as intergroup contexts, and is not limited to condi-
tions of overt conflict (for review see, Haslam and Loughnan,
2014). Instead, dehumanization appears to be an everyday
social phenomenon, rooted in ordinary social-cognitive processes
(Haslam, 2006).
How do people dehumanize others? When someone is dehu-
manized, they are implicitly or explicitly perceived as lacking
qualities that are considered to be characteristically human.
According to Haslam’s (2006) dual model of dehumanization,
there are two forms of dehumanization corresponding to two
different forms of humanness being denied. One is an “ani-
malistic” form of dehumanization in which humans are denied
qualities that are considered to distinguish them from animals—
qualities such as refinement, self-control, intelligence, and ratio-
nality. This form of dehumanization is often discussed in the
context of ethnicity, race, and related topics such as immigra-
tion and genocide (e.g., Kelman, 1976; Chalk and Jonassohn,
1990).
Dehumanization can also take a “mechanistic” form in
which humans are likened to objects or automata and are
denied qualities such as warmth, emotion, and individual-
ity (Haslam, 2006). Such “mechanistic” dehumanization is
more likely to occur in interpersonal interactions and orga-
nizational settings. It is frequently discussed in the con-
texts of technology (Montague and Matson, 1983), medicine
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(Szasz, 1973; Fink, 1982; Barnard, 2001), and other domains
such as sexual objectification (Fredrickson and Roberts, 1997;
Nussbaum, 1999) in which people are often perceived as inert or
instrumental.
Dehumanization can also range from blatant and severe to
subtle and relatively mild (Haslam and Loughnan, 2014). Such
relatively mild dehumanizing behaviors can manifest themselves
in the form of subtle disrespect, condescension, neglect, social
ostracism and other relational slights (Bastian and Haslam, 2011),
often only evident in looks, gestures, and tones of voices. These
subtle, everyday forms of dehumanization are often viewed as
innocent and inconsequential (e.g., Sue et al., 2007). How does
this view compare to the scientific evidence?
THE NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF EVERYDAY
DEHUMANIZATION
There is overwhelming evidence for the wide-reaching nega-
tive consequences of relatively mild dehumanizing attitudes and
behaviors. Dehumanizing others leads to increased anti-sociality
towards them in the form of increased aggressive behaviors such
as bullying (Obermann, 2011) and harassment (Rudman and
Mescher, 2012), as well as hostile avoidance behaviors such as
social rejection (Martinez et al., 2011). This increased hostil-
ity and aggression are accompanied by reduced moral worth
attributed to those who are dehumanized (Opotow, 1990; Haslam
and Loughnan, 2014) and they are therefore judged less worthy
of protection from harm (Gray et al., 2007; Bastian and Haslam,
2011). The perpetrators of such interpersonal maltreatments
themselves may experience negative emotions such as guilt and
shame (Baumeister et al., 1995; Tangney et al., 1996), which
may lead to even stronger dehumanizing attitudes towards their
targets in an attempt to downplay their suffering and justify their
maltreatment. Such dehumanization in response to guilt has been
demonstrated in intergroup contexts (Castano and Giner-Sorolla,
2006). A vicious cycle may emerge, whereby dehumanization
promotes maltreatment and aggression, which further promotes
dehumanization.
The negative consequences for those who are dehumanized
are also striking. Everyday interpersonal maltreatments can leave
its victims feeling degraded, invalidated, or demoralized (Hinton,
2004; Sue et al., 2007). There is extensive research into the negative
consequences of being denied autonomy (Ryan and Deci, 2000),
betrayed (Finkel et al., 2002), humiliated (Miller, 1993), socially
excluded (Baumeister and Leary, 1995; Twenge et al., 2007), or not
recognized as a person (Honneth, 1992)—all situations that are
likely to be experienced as dehumanizing (Bastian and Haslam,
2011).
When people are mechanistically dehumanized by being
treated as objects, as means to an end, or as lacking the capacity for
feeling, they tend to enter into “cognitive deconstructive” states
that are characterized by reduced clarity of thought, emotional
numbing, cognitive inflexibility, and an absence of meaningful
thought (Twenge et al., 2003; Bastian and Haslam, 2011). Expe-
riencing this form of dehumanization leads to pervasive feelings
of sadness and anger. Also dehumanizing are status-reducing
interpersonal maltreatments such as condescension, degradation,
or being treated as embarrassing, incompetent, unintelligent, or
unsophisticated (Vohs et al., 2007), which lead to feelings of guilt
and shame (Bastian and Haslam, 2011).
Such dehumanizing maltreatments are likely to have a
detrimental effect on psychological wellbeing. According to
self-determination theory (Ryan and Deci, 2000), psycholog-
ical wellbeing requires that the basic psychological needs of
autonomy, competence, and relatedness are met. Dehuman-
izing maltreatments, however subtle, lead to impaired ability
to satisfy these needs and may therefore directly contribute
to mental illnesses such as depression, anxiety, and stress-
related disorders. In short, the scientific evidence does not
support the view of everyday dehumanization as an inno-
cent and inconsequential phenomenon; on the contrary, the
evidence clearly demonstrates a range of significant negative
consequences.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EMPATHY AND PROBLEM
SOLVING
Another commonly held view about dehumanization concerns
the relationship between empathy and problem solving. Accord-
ing to this view, there is a trade-off between empathy and problem
solving (e.g., Haque and Waytz, 2012) and the two are mutually
incompatible; therefore, suppressing empathy is necessary for
effective problem solving. To what extent does psychological and
neuroscientific research support this view?
Human thinking and problem solving can be said to occur
in two distinct domains: the physical domain, which involves
reasoning about the mechanical properties of inanimate objects,
and the social domain, which involves thinking about the mental
states of others (Jack et al., 2012)– a process also known as “men-
talizing” (Frith et al., 1991). Psychological and neuroscientific
research shows that empathy—or our capacity to recognize other
people’s emotions—is not only compatible with problem solving
in the social domain, but that it is also crucial for it (Amodio and
Frith, 2006; Harris and Fiske, 2006). On the other hand, is there
evidence that empathy is incompatible with problem solving in
the physical domain?
A distinction between social and physical problem solving has
been suggested at the neural level. Social reasoning about the
mental states of others is associated with increased recruitment
of the brain’s “default” network and reduced recruitment of
the so called “task-positive” network; conversely, “mechanistic”
reasoning about physical objects appears to be associated with
increased recruitment of the “task-positive” network and reduced
recruitment of the “default” network (Jack et al., 2012). Although
these two networks are involved in multiple processes and the
specificity of their function is still under much debate, they appear
to be frequently anti-correlated during conditions of “rest” (Fox
et al., 2005) and during many standard cognitive tasks (Shulman
et al., 1997).
Anti-correlations between the “default” and the “task-positive”
networks were originally interpreted to indicate that the two
networks function in opposition to each other and are marked
by a negative reciprocal relationship (e.g., Fox et al., 2005). More
recently however, neuroscientists have realized that the exact
nature of the neural relationship between these two networks is
much more complex than a simple obligatory negative reciprocity
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(e.g., Spreng et al., 2010; Boyatzis et al., 2014). Positive corre-
lations or lack of anti-correlations between the two networks
have been observed during creative thinking (Ellamil et al., 2011),
mind-wandering (Christoff et al., 2009), and naturalistic film
viewing (Golland et al., 2007). Furthermore, it has become appar-
ent that reduced recruitment in one network does not necessarily
lead to increased recruitment in the other. With specific relevance
to dehumanization, reductions in “default” network recruitment
have been observed in the absence of change in recruitment of
“task-positive” regions (Jack et al., 2013). While this field is new
and still growing, the neuroscientific evidence so far does not
support the notion that reduced empathy (or dehumanization)
automatically and necessarily leads to improved mechanistic rea-
soning at the cognitive level.
There is some evidence, however, that the social and physical
domains may become incompatible at higher levels of reason-
ing complexity. The process of relational integration, or con-
sidering multiple relations simultaneously, characterizes complex
forms of reasoning (Halford et al., 2010) and is specifically
associated with increased recruitment of rostrolateral prefrontal
cortex (RLPFC) during problem solving in both the physical
(e.g., Christoff et al., 2001) and social (Raposo et al., 2011)
domains. Problem solving in the two domains may, therefore,
become incompatible at higher levels of reasoning complexity
due to competition for access to the same neural and cognitive
resources.
In short, scientific evidence suggests that the distinction
between reasoning in the social and physical domains may be
crucial for determining the relationship between empathy and
problem solving. In the social domain, empathy is not only
compatible with problem solving; it is a crucial component of
reasoning about other people’s mental states. In the physical
domain, on the other hand, there is some suggestive evidence
that empathy and mechanistic problem solving may interfere,
especially at higher levels of reasoning complexity (see also Dixon
et al., 2014). However, the notion that reductions in empathy
automatically lead to improved mechanistic problem solving is
not supported by the evidence.
QUESTIONING THE USEFULNESS AND ETHICS OF
DEHUMANIZING STRATEGIES
Dehumanization is sometimes presented as both necessary and
beneficial. For example, it has been argued that dehumanization
and moral disengagement allows physicians to inflict pain on their
patients—pain which is sometimes necessary for diagnosis and
treatment (Lammers and Stapel, 2011; Haque and Waytz, 2012).
This argument has been extended beyond medical contexts, to
argue that dehumanization in general helps people in position
of power to make “tough” decisions that may cause pain and
suffering for others; it helps by allowing such decisions to be
made in a more distant, cold, and rational manner (Lammers
and Stapel, 2011). It has also been argued that by dehumanizing
patients, health care workers can “protect” themselves against
“burnout” from the emotional demands of working with suf-
fering patients (Vaes and Muratore, 2013), and that mechanistic
dehumanization of patients in the form of “decomposing people
and their symptoms into physiological systems and subsystems” is
necessary for “higher level” medical problem solving (Haque and
Waytz, 2012).
Whether such “functional” dehumanization is a truly ben-
eficial strategy, however, is highly questionable. It is true that
physicians sometimes need to inflict pain on their patients
through diagnosis and treatment, but if this pain is necessary
for the reduction in the patient’s overall suffering, physicians
could mentally focus on this overall improvement as a way of
coping. Dehumanizing their patients seems, in comparison, a
much more negative and, arguably, much more dysfunctional way
of coping—especially considering the profoundly negative conse-
quences it can have for the doctor-patient relationship (Benedetti,
2011). Similarly, avoiding burnout in health care workers can be
achieved without requiring them to dehumanize their patients;
instead, health care workers could be provided with reduced
workload and better support. Furthermore, continually having
to suppress their naturally occurring empathic response may
create an additional form of stress in some health care workers.
Alternative forms of emotional regulation (Gross, 1998; Grandey,
2000) may help reduce health care workers’ stress with fewer
costs to themselves and their patients. Overall, the argument that
dehumanization helps health care workers provide “better care”
(Vaes and Muratore, 2013) only makes sense if “care” itself is
understood in a dehumanized mechanistic sense.
It is also true that people in position of power sometimes have
to make “tough” decisions that may cause pain and suffering
for others. The difficulty in such “tough” decisions, however,
comes from their moral nature and the ethical dilemmas they
present. Moral reasoning and decisions making by definition
require that we use our emotions and our experiences of being
human—emotional and otherwise. Dehumanizing those about
whom we are making a moral decision would of course eliminate
the moral elements of the decision making process (and therefore
make it “easier” for the decision maker), but it should also
raise some serious ethical concerns. A much more constructive
and ethically acceptable way to ease the burden of such diffi-
cult moral decisions would be to relieve the person in power
of the decision making responsibility and to place it where it
rightfully belongs: with the person who will bear the greatest
consequences of the decision. In medical contexts, this person
would be the patient (or the patient’s chosen substitute decision
maker). On the rare occasions when a patient is unable to make
such decisions and there is no available substitute decision maker,
physicians could seek moral support and advice from others and
could allow the necessary time and emotional expenditure it
takes to respect the moral and ethical nature of medical decision
making.
As well, the argument that mechanistic dehumanization, in
the sense of reducing patients to their symptoms and body
parts, is necessary for medical problem solving rests on an
outdated and largely discredited “biomedical” model of dis-
ease. The narrow, exclusive focus on anatomical, physiologi-
cal, and molecular mechanisms within this “biomedical” model
has been criticized and rejected in favor of the much broader
“biopsychosocial” model of disease and recovery (Engel, 1977;
Benedetti, 2011), which requires that psychological and social fac-
tors are included alongside biological factors in medical diagnosis
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and decision making. Within this newer model, dehumaniza-
tion would be expected to impair medical problem solving by
causing the relevance of psychological and social factors to be
neglected.
Thus, viewing dehumanization as “functional” and beneficial
only makes sense within a very narrow and mechanistic context.
What appears “functional” within this narrow context, appears
clearly dysfunctional from a broader and more humanized per-
spective. Far from being necessary, dehumanization in medical
contexts can be replaced by superior strategies that are ethically
much more acceptable and do not entail the negative consequence
that become apparent when dehumanization is viewed from a
broader perspective.
CONCLUSIONS
Many of our beliefs about the role of dehumanization are based
on implicit empirical claims that can be examined in light of the
scientific evidence. Here I examined a number of such beliefs
and found relatively little support for them. First, contrary to
the commonly held belief that everyday forms of dehumanization
are innocent and inconsequential, the evidence shows profoundly
negative consequences of such milder forms of dehumanization
for both victims and perpetrators. Second, the belief that reduc-
tions in empathy automatically lead to improved mechanistic
problem solving is not supported by the evidence. Third, the
belief that empathy is incompatible with problem solving is par-
tially supported by the evidence, but only if “problem solving”
is equated with mechanistic reasoning about inanimate objects
in the physical domain. If problem solving is instead equated
with mentalizing, or social reasoning about other people’s mental
states, this belief is contradicted by the evidence which shows that
empathy is a necessary and a crucial element of problem solving
in the social domain. Overall, there seems to be a need to reassess
our beliefs about the role of dehumanization in organizational
settings.
Dehumanization in organizational settings is a highly complex
phenomenon with far-reaching implications, from individual,
to societal, to global environmental levels. Although scientific
evidence can be brought to bear in examining the validity of
commonly held beliefs in this area, the present analysis also shows
that many of those beliefs carry significant moral and ethical
implications. Furthermore, those beliefs may also have implicit
normative aspects that have remained unexamined so far.
An interesting case of a complex mixture of an empirical
claim and an implicit normative statement may be presented by
the argument that suppressing empathy is necessary for problem
solving in organizational settings. There is empirical evidence in
support of this argument, but only if “problem solving” is reduced
to problem solving in the physical domain (i.e., mechanistic
problem solving about inanimate objects). Therefore, this argu-
ment privileges the value of mechanistic problem solving over the
value of problem solving in the social domain, thus making an
implicit normative statement. In other words, when employees
are encouraged to suppress empathy and focus on “getting the job
done”, they are also given the message that mechanistic problem
solving is more efficient at getting the job done than empathy or
mentalizing. Such implicit normative statements may sometimes
lie at the basis of what may appear to be empirically-based
arguments.
Recognizing the co-existence of empirical and normative bases
of our beliefs about dehumanization can help us develop a
more effective approach to their critical examination. While the
empirical basis of our beliefs, when identified, can be exam-
ined in light of findings from scientific research, the normative
aspects of our beliefs are beyond the scope of scientific evidence.
Instead, they need to be assessed from ethical, philosophical, and
legalistic perspectives. Only an integrated approach that brings
together these multiple levels of analysis can help us achieve what
seems to be an insurmountable and yet a vitally important task:
the humanization of our organizations and, ultimately, the re-
humanization of our society.
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